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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The State of Idaho appeals from the district court's order granting 
suppression of evidence. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Trooper Otto stopped Victor Samuel Garcia-Rodriguez's car after it 
crossed the fog line without signaling. (Tr., p. 14, L. 10 - p. 15, L. 1; p. 34, L. 7 -
p. 37, L. 10.) After Trooper Otto made contact with Garcia he requested Garcia's 
driver's license, registration and proof of insurance. (Tr., p. 17, Ls. 12-16.) 
Garcia produced a Mexican consulate card as identification, but no driver's 
license, proof of insurance or registration. (Tr., p. 15, L. 21 - p. 16, L. 3; p. 37, 
Ls. 5-11; Defense Exhibit B.) When Trooper Otto ran Garcia's name through 
dispatch it failed to produce any information. (Tr., p. 17, L. 22 - p. 18, L. 4; p. 39, 
Ls. 2-7; p. 43, L. 1 - p. 44, L. 5.) Garcia admitted not having a driver's license. 
(Tr., p. 39, Ls. 13-15.) 
The car was a rental. (Tr., p. 37, Ls. 12-22.) Garcia stated that the car 
"was his friend's vehicle." (Tr., p. 39, L. 16 - p. 40, L. 1.) An investigation 
showed that the name on the rental agreement was "Bill Walker," and the rental 
agreement prohibited other operators of the car. (Tr., p. 51, Ls. 2 - p. 53, L. 3; 
State's Exhibit 2.) Garcia consented to a search of the car. (Tr., p. 45, Ls. 3-9.) 
The search revealed two "bricks" of money bundled in rubber bands inside a 
shaving kit inside a plastic bag inside another plastic bag. (Tr., p. 45, L. 17 - p. 
47, L. 3; State's Exhibit 1.) Based on training and experience, Trooper Otto 
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associated the cash, due to its amount and the manner in which it was bundled 
and stored, with drug trafficking. (Tr., p. 50, Ls. 8-21.) 
Trooper Otto arrested Garcia for failure to purchase a driver's license. 
(Tr., p. 54, L. 1 - p. 56, L. 16.) In a search incident to arrest Trooper Otto found 
methamphetamine in Garcia's pocket. (Tr., p. 31, Ls. 5-13.) 
The State charged Garcia with trafficking in methamphetamine and 
possession of paraphernalia. (R., pp. 49-50.) Garcia filed a motion to suppress 
"evidence of the methamphetamine discovered on the person of the Defendant." 
(R., p. 69.) The district court granted the motion. (R., pp. 137-67, 174-206.) The 
State filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 209-11.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err by suppressing because the stop was justified by 
reasonable suspicion, the arrest was justified by probable cause, and the search 
of Garcia's person was proper incident to arrest? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Suppressing Because The Stop Was Justified By 
Reasonable Suspicion, The Arrest Was Justified By Probable Cause, And The 
Search Of Garcia's Person Was Proper Incident To Arrest 
A. Introduction 
The district court concluded that the initial traffic stop was not supported 
by reasonable suspicion (R., pp. 183-91) and that the ongoing detention and 
ultimate arrest of Garcia was not supported by reasonable suspicion and 
probable cause, respectively (R., pp. 191-204). Application of the correct legal 
standards to the facts of this case shows a proper stop and arrest. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, the appellate court 
accepts the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial 
evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to those 
facts. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P .3d 739, 7 41 (2007). 
C. The Traffic Stop Was Supported By Reasonable Suspicion Of A Traffic 
Infraction 
"A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants 
and implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures." State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785 
(Ct. App. 2006) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)). 
Ordinarily, a warrantless seizure must be based on probable cause to be 
reasonable. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); State v. Bishop, 
146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009). However, limited investigatory 
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detentions, based on less than probable cause, are permissible when justified by 
an officer's reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is 
about to commit, a crime. Royer, 460 U.S.at 498; Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 
P.3d at 1210. "An officer may also stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal 
behavior if there is reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being 
driven contrary to traffic laws." Young, 144 Idaho at 648, 167 P.3d at 785 (citing 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981 )). "Reasonable suspicion requires 
less than probable cause but more than speculation or instinct on the part of the 
officer." State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 302, 246 P.3d 673, 675 (Ct. App. 2010) 
(citation omitted). Whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion is 
evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or 
before the time of the stop. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210; State v. 
Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). 
Trooper Otto observed Garcia drive over the fog line on the freeway exit 
ramp (R., p. 175 (district court's finding that Garcia's "right tires crossed the right 
fog line"), creating reasonable suspicion of a driving infraction. The analysis of 
the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Slater, 136 Idaho 293, 32 P.3d 685 (Ct. 
App. 2001), is controlling in this case: 
Idaho Code § 49-630(1) requires that a vehicle be driven on 
the right half of the roadway, except in certain circumstances that 
are not applicable in this case. The "roadway" means that portion 
of a highway that is "improved, designed or ordinarily used for 
vehicular travel." I.C. § 49-119(18) [now I.C. § 49-119(19)]. It does 
not include "sidewalks, shoulders, berms [or] rights-of-way." Id. 
Accordingly, when Officer Burns observed Slater's tires cross the 
fog line, albeit fleetingly, Burns now possessed the requisite 
reasonable suspicion that Slater had violated I.C. § 49-630 by 
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driving on the shoulder of the highway, rather than on the 
"roadway." 
~ at 298, 32 P.3d at 690. Likewise, when Trooper Otto saw Garcia drive on the 
shoulder instead of the roadway, "albeit fleetingly," he had reasonable suspicion 
to stop Garcia. See also State v. Neal, _ Idaho_, _ P.3d _, 2014 WL 
5151426 (Idaho App., 2014) (review pending) (driving on top of the fog line 
created reasonable suspicion of violation of I.C. § 49-637(1 )). Because Garcia's 
act of driving across the fog line created reasonable suspicion, the district court 
erred in finding the initial traffic stop unreasonable. 
D. The Continued Detention And Eventual Arrest Of Garcia Was Supported 
By Probable Cause, And The Search Of His Pocket Was A Proper Search 
Incident To Arrest 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. 
"A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain 
special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. 
Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 
4 79, 988 P .2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999).) A search incident to lawful arrest is a 
well-established exception to the warrant requirement and, as such, does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment. Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 
(1969); Kerley, 134 Idaho at 874, 11 P.3d at 493. "For an arrest to be considered 
lawful, it must be based on probable cause" to believe the arrestee has 
committed a crime. State v. Bishop. 146 Idaho 804, 816, 203 P.3d 1203, 1215 
(2009) (citations omitted). "Probable cause exists when the facts and 
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circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the 
offense has been or is being committed." 19.:. (citations, quotations, and brackets 
omitted). 
In this case Trooper Otto developed probable cause to believe that Garcia 
had no driver's license, a violation of I.C. § 49-301 (1 ). (R., p. 176 (district court's 
finding that Garcia produced only a Mexican Consulate card when asked for a 
driver's license and admitted not having a driver's license).) This alone 
constitutionally justified Garcia's arrest. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171-72 
(2008) (probable cause constitutionally justifies arrest regardless of state laws 
imposing additional requirements). Moreover, Trooper Otto's subsequent 
investigation revealed that Garcia was in this country illegally, had only Mexican 
consular identification, spoke little English, was not in law enforcement 
databases, was driving a car rented by someone else, and had bricks of cash 
Trooper Otto associated with drug trafficking. 1 This gave him grounds to arrest 
under state law. I.C. § 49-1407(1) (arrest for traffic misdemeanors allowed 
1 It appears that the district court concluded that the consent leading to discovery 
of the cash was involuntary based on the court's conclusion there was an illegal 
detention. (R., pp. 155-159; 194-98.) The factors listed by the district court as 
coercive were asking Garcia to exit the vehicle, that the patrol lights were on, that 
Garcia was not free to leave and the trooper did not inform Garcia of his right to 
refuse his request. It is well established that a lawful investigative detention, 
standing alone, does not demonstrate coercion. State v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho 
296, 302-03, 912 P.2d 664, 670-71 (Ct. App. 1995). Likewise, the Supreme 
Court of the United States had "rejected in specific terms the suggestion that 
police officers must always inform citizens of their right to refuse when seeking 
permission to conduct a warrantless consent search." United States v. Drayton, 
536 U.S. 194, 206 (2002). Asking Garcia for consent to search in the course of a 
lawful detention without informing him of his right to refuse the request did not 
render the consent involuntary. 
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where "the person does not furnish satisfactory evidence of identity or when the 
officer has reasonable and probable grounds to believe the person will disregard 
a written promise to appear in court"). Application of the relevant legal standards 
shows Trooper Otto almost immediately developed probable cause of a new 
crime, driving without a license, which justified Garcia's continued detention and 
eventual arrest, as well as the search incident to arrest that revealed the 
methamphetamine in his pocket. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's 
orders suppressing evidence and remand for further proceedings. 
DATED this 13th day of April, 2015. 
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